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Abstract
In this study I examine foul calls by NBA referees alongside the difference in
aggressiveness of twelve NBA basketball teams as they compete for the Championship
Title. I aim to identify referee biases that increase the likelihood of the NBA Finals
ending in a later game due to league revenue incentives. My data consists of 91
individual NBA Finals games played between the 2001 and 2016 NBA Finals. After
controlling for changes in play as well as the difference in aggressiveness, I find that
NBA referee’s foul calls are more dependent on a call on the opposing team in situations
with a larger series score spread. Additionally, I identify a consistent officiating bias
towards the home team. My results imply an effort by the NBA to increase the
probability of the series ending in a later game, possibly motivated by increased revenues
for the league and all parties involved.
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Introduction
On June 19th, 2016 the Cleveland Cavilers did the unthinkable, they came back
from a (3,1) lag against the Golden State Warriors and won the 2016 National Basketball
Association (NBA) Finals. A mere nine days before, the Warriors had just won their third
game of the series, and they were a shoo-in for the victory. At that time Vegas was
predicting a 1.2% chance of the Cavilers winning the series, a next to impossible feat. As
I watched the seventh and final game of the series I could not help but notice all of the
hype surrounding the event. Every other sentence from the announcer pertained to some
record being broken whether it be ticket sales, viewership, ad pricing, all of the past sales
records had been left in the dust.
The 2016 NBA Finals game seven was the third most watched game in NBA
history peeking with almost 45 million viewers, and averaging 31 million viewers
throughout the game. 1 Ticket sales skyrocketed after the Cavilers beat the Warriors in
game six and sent the series to a deciding game seven. Courtside VIP seats for game
seven were listed for $122,000 and average ticket prices jumped over $1000.2 As I
watched the immense amount of money surround game seven, I could not help but think
the NBA had some how made this happen. Had game five decided the series, the NBA
and all parties involved would have missed out on potential revenues in excess of $100
million.3 This thought sparked my interest in investigating whether or not the NBA was
fixing games. After speaking with various friends who were knowledgeable and
passionate about the NBA, I decided it was unlikely the NBA would directly fix games.
NBA Communications, 2016 Finals Summary
Tuttle, Brad. "NBA Finals Game 7 Ticket Prices Shoot Up an Extra $1,000."
3 Tuttle, Brad. "Here’s How Much Money ABC & the NBA Make with an NBA Finals Game 7"
1
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However, I still believed the NBA would do everything in their power to increase the
likelihood of the Finals going to game seven. This led me to my investigation into referee
biases in the NBA Finals.
Upon my review of previous literature on the subject I found various studies
aiming to identify referee bias in the NBA as well as the NCAA. Anderson and Pierce
(2009) examined foul calls in the NCAA and find referees will traditionally favor the
lagging team as well as the home team. Their insights give direction for how to identify
bias in basketball; however, the authors chose to examine regular season games opposed
to post season games. A similar study by Price et al. (2012) assessed referee calls in the
NBA, and aimed to identify a bias using discretionary and nondiscretionary turnovers. I
find similar results to those found by Price et al. (2012), although, I use fouls as my
measure of bias opposed to turnovers.
After deciding to examine foul calls by the referees, I had to establish how I
expected to uncover the bias I believed was present. My advisor, who has done extensive
work in tournament competition research, encouraged me to investigate how the
aggressiveness of the two teams shifted throughout the series. Cabral (2003) and
Ozbeklik and Smith (2014) both find that competitors in multi-period competitions vary
in risk-taking behavior as well as effort exerted depending on their position in the
standings. This led me to establish an aggressiveness metric to measure the difference in
team’s aggressiveness as the series progressed.
My study builds on current literature pertaining to NBA referee biases, and also
contributes to existing literature on competitor behavior in competition settings. Although
my study relates directly to the NBA Finals, it offers an outline for identifying officiating
2

biases in a variety of tournament settings. My results shed light on what may be an effort
by the NBA to increase the likelihood the Finals ending in a later series game due to
revenue incentives, however, there still stands an immeasurable amount of work to
ascertain such an effort.

Background on the NBA Finals
The NBA Finals have been played after every NBA season since the NBA’s
inception, beginning with the first Finals in 1947. The Finals consist of a seven game
series in which the winners of the Eastern and Western Conference Finals compete for
the Larry O’Brien Championship Trophy. The first team to win four games in the series
emerges victorious. The current structure of the Finals is a 2-2-1-1-1 format in which the
first two games are played at the home of the higher seeded team, then the following two
games are played at the home of the lower seeded team, then the last three games
alternate with the 5th and 7th games being played at the home of the higher seed, and the
6th game at the home of the lower seed.
The Finals have been anything but consistent throughout their history. From name
changes to structural changes, the finals have transformed along with the shifting board
and commissioners. In 1984 David Stern took over control from Larry O’Brien as
Commissioner of the NBA. One of the first changes he instituted as Commissioner was a
structural change to the 1984-1985 NBA Finals. Stern argued, teams, as well as media,
were caused unnecessary stress by the 2-2-1-1-1 format due to the requirement to fly
back-and-fourth across the country to play the final games of the series. In order to ease
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the burden on all parties involved, Stern changed the format of the Finals from the
original 2-2-1-1-1 format to a 2-3-2 format. Although this change did ease stress on the
players and media alike, many also argued it increased the likelihood of the series ending
in a later game because it provided the lower seeded team with one additional home game
before returning to the home court of the higher seeded team. The NBA continued with
the new structure until 2013 when Adam Silver took the reins from Stern. Again with the
shift in power, one of the first changes instituted was the shift back to the original 2-2-11-1 format. Thus far the Finals have remained in their original format of 2-2-1-1-1, but
the consistency of structure remains to be seen with future shifts in the administration.
Additionally, the NBA has also made recent changes to the instant replay rules.
Instant reply was first introduced to the NBA in 2002; since then it has become
instrumental in making calls, especially foul calls. After the reorganization of the NBA
Competition Committee in 2012, the NBA began making major changes to the calling
power allotted to the instant replay reviewers. For the 2012-2013 season the Competition
Committee introduced extended use of reply, which allows referees to make flagrant foul
calls after the game is over upon review of the game footage.4 Along with this change
came several others allowing for more autonomy over calls, however, the rules also place
more control in the hands of the reviewers allowing them to alter the outcome of a game
even after it has finished.
The most recent change to the NBA Finals is a change to the playoff seeding.
Originally, the top teams from each division of the NBA were guaranteed a top four seed
in their respective conference playoffs. If the division winner did not have a better record
4

NBA Communications, NBA Board of Governors approves expanded use of replay
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than their opponent then they lost home court advantage, but they maintained their seed.
For the 2015-2016 season the NBA Board of Governors voted to do away with the
guaranteed top four seed for the division winners, and shift to a playoff seeding structure
based purely on record.5 This changes allowed for a higher likelihood of having the best
teams in the finals, and in turn increase the overall probability the finals end in a later
game.
Background on NBA Finals Viewership & Revenues
In 2010 the NBA set records with their broadest Finals reach ever. The Finals
were broadcast in 215 countries and territories in 41 languages. 6 This marked the
beginning of an NBA initiative to expand Finals viewership worldwide. After a
successful 2010 season the NBA began investing in a variety of vehicles to expand
viewership to stretches of the world that had never experienced the NBA. This
investment included the ability to watch the Finals on NBA.com and NBA Mobile, and in
2013 NBA Digital, the NBA’s multimedia conglomerate, set yet another record year.
After 2013 the NBA saw a market opportunity and began to build out their social
media platform. Over the course of the next two years the NBA launched social media
campaigns on: Facebook, Twitter, Google, Instagram, and Snapchat to gain user
interaction. This investment paid off, and in 2015 the NBA shattered viewership records
with an average 20 million viewers per Finals game. During the series NBA Digital
delivered 336 million combined video views during the 2015 Finals. By the end of the
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NBA Communications, NBA to seed conference playoff teams by record
NBA Communications, NBA Finals: Broadest reach ever
5

2015 Finals the NBA had 835 million combined social media followers after adding 250
million over the course of the season.7
The 2016 season brought another record-breaking year with the culmination of
the Finals. Game seven averaged 31 million viewers on ABC making it the third most
watched NBA game of all time, and in China garnered 15.3 million unique viewers over
all platforms making it the most watched NBA game in China’s history.8 The NBA also
surpassed 1 billion social media followers making it the first sports league in the world to
pass 1 billion followers.

Hypothesis Development
Average ticket prices for the 2016 NBA Finals shot up over $1000 when the
Cleveland Cavilers won game six and pushed the series to a deciding game seven.9 There
is no question that everyone benefits from the NBA Finals being pushed to an additional
game. The fans get to watch a more intense match. The broadcasting agencies get to run
more adds. The NBA gets to sell more merchandise and tickets. It is really a win-win for
everyone. This is precisely the thought I had as I watched the Cleveland Cavilers win
game six after coming back from a (3-1) lag in 2016. So, if everyone wins, why not push
the series to a game seven?
Over the course of the 2015 NBA postseason 81 games were played between 16
total teams. The Finals went to games six, but ended when the Golden State Warriors

NBA Communications, NBA Finals 2015 by the numbers
Historic NBA Finals 2016 set TV, Social, Digital and merchandise records
9 Tuttle, Brad. "NBA Finals Game 7 Ticket Prices Shoot Up an Extra $1,000."
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beat the Cleveland Cavilers in game six. Ad sales from the 81 televised games combined
to generate a whooping $613 million dollars in sales.10 AdAge, a prominent Ad statistics
reporter, estimated that had there been a game seven ABC would have generated an
additional $45 million in ad sales.11 This means that while game seven only makes up
1.2% of the total games played, it generates over 7% of the total ad sales. Ad revenue is
still only a portion of the total revenues received in the event of an extra Finals game. The
NBA is also able to capitalize on additional merchandise sales, ticket sales, and in the
event of a revenue sharing agreement with the broadcasting agency the excess ad
revenues once the Finals achieve a certain ad sales benchmark.
Due to the possible revenues available at little to no cost I see no reason why the
NBA would not be inclined to do everything in their power to increase the probability of
a Finals game five, six, or seven. So, when considering ways the NBA could affect this
probability I chose to focus on foul calls. After reviewing previous literature on the
subject I found that competitors who are leading often exert less effort, and teams who
are lagging exert more effort. This led me determine my first hypothesis:
Teams lagging in the NBA Finals will exert more effort as the possibility of
them losing increases, and teams who are leading in the NBA Finals will exert
less effort as the possibility of them winning increases.
Next, I had to determine where I expected to see a bias in the referee’s calls. If the
referees were incentivized to increase the probability of the Finals reaching a game five,
six, or seven, then I would expect them to favor the lagging team. Naturally, if my first

10
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Crupi, Anthony. "With the Warriors on Fire, NBA Generates Big Bucks for TNT, ESPN."
Tuttle, Brad. "Here’s How Much Money ABC & the NBA Make with an NBA Finals Game 7"
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hypothesis holds, then I would expect to see more fouls by the lagging team and less
fouls by the leading team as the series spread increases. In the event of the referees
favoring the lagging team I would expect to see little to no change in the proportion of
foul calls on the lagging team while their overall aggressiveness increased throughout the
series. This led me to my second hypothesis:
While the aggressiveness of the lagging team increases and the aggressiveness
of the leading team decreases, I expect to observe little to no change in the
proportion of foul calls on the lagging team to the leading team due to a
referee bias towards the lagging team.

Previous Literature
When considering how to acquire the most informative literature for my study I
chose to construct my search around two primary bases. The first assumption of my study
is: as the distance between two tournament competitors increases the laggard will
increase their effort and risk taking behavior, and the leader will decrease their effort and
risk taking behavior. To support this assumption I present several studies concerning the
complexities of effort and risk taking behavior put forth by competitors in a variety of
tournament competition settings. The second notion of my study is the assumption of
referee bias towards the laggard of the NBA Finals in an effort to increase revenues and
the likelihood the finals end in game five, six, or seven. To establish an empirical
approach to identifying referee biases I consider a multitude of studies aimed at
ascertaining specific biases in sports officiating, and in particular NBA and NCAA
basketball officiating.
8

Economic literature investigating competitor behavior in tournament competition
settings is far from limited. Cabral (2003) considers R&D investment in an infinite time
horizon multi-period race where competitors are given the option to chose a low payoff,
low variance technology or a high payoff, high variance technology. The study seeks to
determine a player’s optimal strategy as a function of their relative positioning. Cabral
asserts a firm’s payoff is a function of the quality difference between its product and the
rival’s, so payoffs are monotonic and symmetric, just as they are in the NBA Finals.
Based on the results Cabral concludes in equilibrium the leader will most often chose the
safer strategy, and the laggard the more risky strategy. Although he uses an infinite time
horizon, Cabral concurs a similar result would be derived from a finite tournament
structure “…thus formalizing the sports intuition that the laggard has nothing to lose.”
Similarly to Cabral’s study, Ozbeklik and Smith (2014) examine risk-taking
behavior in tournament competition through the lens of professional golf. The study aims
to measure risk taking in one-on-one, single elimination golf tournaments using data
taken from 579 professional golf matches and over 18,000 holes from 2003 to 2013. To
assign a measure of risk-taking the authors use two approaches. First, they observe the
percentage of holes conceded. This statistic offers insight into the holes where contestants
took a risk and were unsuccessful. Second, they consider the standard deviation of
relative-to-par scores of a hole over the course of the competition. Measuring the
standard deviation of relative-to-par scores allows the researchers to identify holes with a
high score variance, therefore, implying the larger the variance of a hole the more risk
taken on that particular hole. Using both approaches Ozbeklik and Smith find players
who were ahead adopted more conservative play, and players who were lagging adopted
9

more risky behavior. This finding was emphasized as the players came closer to the end
of the tournament, and also as the difference between the two players scores increased.
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) test how particular tournament features
affect contestant incentives and efforts over the course of the tournament. Specifically,
the study considers a multi-period sales contest organized by a manufacturer amongst its
retailers to observe how participant’s incentives evolve as the contest progresses. The
contest provides a static environment in which homogeneous competitors reach a
symmetric equilibrium, however, introducing the multi-period structure generates
heterogeneity amidst the competitors due to the interim performance of each competitor.
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez find the introduction of the contest significantly impacts
retailer’s efforts and incentivizes them to sell more goods. Additionally, they also observe
a significant decrease in the efforts of leading competitors as well as an increase in the
efforts of the lagging competitors to try to catch up. These tendencies increase as the
distance between the competitors grows. However, as the gap grows to be too large to
make up the researchers witness a decrease in motivation and effort by the lagging
players, although, this finding is most likely irrelevant in a seven game series.
In addition to the previously referenced studies on risk-taking behavior, Genakos
and Pagliero (2012) consider the effects of interim rank on weight announcements in
professional weightlifting. The study uses panel data from the Olympics and the World
and European Weightlifting Championships from 1990 to 2006. In weightlifting
competitions competitors are scored off of the amount of weight successfully lifted.
Therefore, higher weight announcements represent riskier behavior because they imply a
larger difference in the case of success or failure. The study finds that competitors
10

lagging behind are more likely to make risky announcements than competitors who are in
the lead. The evidence displays an inverted-U relationship with interim rank.
Announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then fall and become equivalent to
first place by the 17th rank.
To attempt to measure risk-taking behavior in basketball I must first understand
how certain factors contribute to a teams success or failure. Stern (1994) creates a
Brownian Motion model to predict who will win an NBA basketball game as a function
of time remaining in the game t ∈ (0,1), and the difference in score X(t). When observing
data from 493 NBA games Stern finds home teams consistently outscore visiting teams
by roughly 1.5 points in the end of the first, second and third quarters, but lose the
majority of the lead in the fourth quarter. The authors attributed this to coaching
decisions to remove top players towards the end of the game because of their lead. This
finding led me to consider not only the player’s risk-taking behavior during a game, but
also the coach’s risk-taking behavior. I elaborate on this finding in the Methods section
later in this paper.
Zak, Huang and Siegfried (1979) similarly attempt to create a production function
for an NBA team; however, they do so using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
researchers use data from 375 games over the 1976-77 NBA season. In regard to personal
fouls the study finds a 1% increase in the ratio of personal fouls in the game leads to
a .11% decrease in the point ratio between the teams. Additionally, when considering the
possibility of a home court advantage the study finds teams perform better at home
opposed to on the road, specifically in shooting accuracy and number of rebounds. The
study does not find any correlation of on-the-road point deficit and officiating.
11

In conflict with Zak, Huang and Siegfried’s finding, Lehman and Reifman (1987)
observe a difference in home vs. away officiating, but only with star players. The
researchers hypothesize star players are less likely to have a foul called at home rather
than away because fans are biased towards their favorite players. The study measures the
difference between foul calls on star players12 at home and away, and non-star players at
home and away. Leman and Reifman find star players are less likely to be called for fouls
at home than away, this is significant at the 5% level. Additionally, the study also finds
non-star players are just as likely to be called for a foul at home as they are on the road.
These findings, in contradiction to the study done by Huang and Siegfried, imply there is
a home court advantage in game officiating.
Officiating biases can favor one specific team, or both teams simultaneously.
Anderson and Pierce (2009) examine patterns in foul calls during 365 NCAA basketball
games throughout the 2004-2005 season. They estimate expected foul differential based
on a binomial distribution. The researchers then compare the expected foul differential
with the empirical and find the actual variance is significantly less than the expected
variance, therefore, suggesting the foul calls are not independent. Anderson and Pierce
find fouls are more likely to be called on: the team with the fewest fouls, the visitor, and
the leading team. The data suggests the probability of the next foul being called on the
visitor can reach .7 in specific conditions due to the observed biases. Secondly, the study
maps the probability of the next foul being called on the home team based on the current
foul differential. They find referees consistently favor the home team as indicated by the
equilibrium probability of .438. One key distinction of this study is they only compare
12

Star players are identified by all-star status, draft rank, and scoring status
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fouls called in the first half of the game to control for fouls called in the last few minutes
of the game, assuming they are intentional.
Foul calls, as explained previously, can have a large impact of the outcome of a
game. If the officials of a game are biased this can cause a game to transpire unnaturally,
and in some cases profitably. Price et al. (2012) and Thu et al. (2002) identify officiating
biases and explain how they relate to league profitability. Price et al. (2012) distinguish
between discretionary turnovers13 and nondiscretionary turnovers14 to identify a referee
bias. They also consider fouls called by the referees. The researchers track the difference
between both types of turnovers over varying game situations to discern between
differences in play by the players and referee bias. When tracking the DTO and NTO the
study finds refs favor home teams, teams that are lagging in a game, and teams that are
lagging in a series. While NTO remained relatively constant over different game
scenarios, the study finds DTOs are called more often on the disadvantaged team. While
the study does consider shooting fouls vs. non-shooting fouls, the results are not
significant and provide little insight. The researchers also consider the profit benefits to
referee bias and find all biases are profitable to the NBA. In conjunction, the study finds
referees who work playoff games were more likely to be assigned to games where a weak
home team was playing a strong visitor, “…this indicates the league makes ref
assignments in a strategic way, and rewards refs who help teams when they need it most.”
Thu et al. (2002) aim to identify two systematic biases of NCAA Division 1
referees: if referees call a disproportionate amount of fouls on the leading team, and if the
disproportionality of fouls called increases with nationally televised games. In the initial
13
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DTO - call made by the referee
NTO - call made obvious by the players, out of bounds etc.
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observation the researchers find foul calls in the last two minutes differ vastly from the
rest of the game because the losing team typically intentionally fouls the winning team as
the game comes to an end.15 To control for this the researchers leave all fouls called in
the last two minutes out of their analysis. After controlling for fouls called in the last two
minutes the researchers find on average leading teams have 6% more fouls called on
them, this in significant to the 1% level. Additionally, the researchers also find NCAA
Division 1 games that are televised on primary networks have a significant increase in
fouls called against the leading team opposed to games that are not televised or televised
on local channels, this is significant to the 1% level also.
To summarize, the notion that as the distance between two tournament
competitors increases the laggard is more likely to increase their effort and risky behavior
and the leader in more likely to decrease their effort and risky behavior, is widely
supported by tournament theory literature. Whether or not this increase or decrease is
distinctly effort or distinctly risk remains more vague, but for the purpose of my study is
obsolete. In regard to my second assumption, it can be determined officiating biases exist
in sporting events and quite possibly the NBA. Whether these biases are a direct result of
profit seeking stands unclear, however, the financial benefits to a referee bias in the NBA
are explainable and quite plausibly a motivator for the bias I expect to observe.

15

Equal distribution of foul calls over entire game vs. 32%-66% laggard-leader in the last two minutes
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Data
I gather all of my data on individual National Basketball Association (NBA)
Finals games using Basketball Reference, a comprehensive statistical database containing
NBA game summary statistics dating back to 1946. My data includes 91 individual
games played in the 2001 to 2016 NBA Finals. Over the course of the fifteen years I
collect data on, twelve individual teams appear in the NBA Championship, with nine
emerging victorious.
For each individual game I record: the fouls, field goal attempts, three point
attempts, steals, blocks, offensive rebounds, defensive rebounds, and starter to bench
playtime ratio for each team competing in the series. To account for changes in play or
tournament structure I also collect and include in my analysis: the year of the series and
which team is playing at home. For the purpose of controlling for intentional fouls made
in the last two minutes, I use play-by-play data and deduct all fouls made in the last two
minutes. Due to the NBA not beginning to keep play-by-play statistics until the 20002001 season, my data is limited to the fifteen Finals series I include.

15

Methods & Regressions
To test my hypotheses I aim measure the aggressiveness of each team playing, as
well as identify referee bias based on the existing series score.
Measurements of Aggressiveness
Field Goal Attempts to Three Point Attempts
For my first measure of aggressiveness I calculate each team’s field goal attempts
to three-point attempts. In basketball there are three ways to gain points: free throw, field
goal, and three-point shot. Each method delivers one, two, and three points respectively.
As determined by Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) and Genakos and Pagliero
(2012) risk-taking is often exhibited through the decision to take on a high variance, high
payout option opposed to a low variance, low payout option. During the 2016 NBA
season the success percentages for free throws, field goals, and three point shots are 77%,
48%, and 36% respectively. 16 Therefore, because three-point shots have the lowest
success percentage and the highest payout, one can assume teams exhibiting risky and
aggressive behavior will take more three-point shots than their counterparts. The ratio of
FGA/TPA allows for me to determine when teams are playing more conservatively, i.e.
taking easier shots with a higher success percentage, and when they are playing more
aggressively, i.e. taking more risky shots.
Steals
In basketball a player can attempt to steal the ball from the opposing player,
however, this has a high likelihood of resulting in move past the aggressing player by the

16
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ball handler. In that case the ball handler becomes goal-side of the aggressor, and he is
able to freely take a shot or pass the ball. Because of this, attempting to steal the ball is a
gamble. If the aggressor is able to get the ball they are often rewarded with an easy layup
or assist, but if they fail to do so they let down their team and provide the opposing team
with an easier attempt on goal. By including the steals of each team throughout the NBA
Finals I am able to again measure each teams risk-taking behavior and aggressiveness.
Blocks
I also include blocks in my measurement of team aggressiveness. A block results
in a similar outcome to a steal. When blocking the aggressor attempts to swipe the ball
from the opposing players hands as they go for a shot. If the ball handler pump-fakes
when the aggressor attempts to block, the ball handler can easily step to the side of the
aggressor and take an unguarded shot. Therefore, a block can result in a defended shot
and often a turnover for the aggressing team, but if the attempt goes wrong the ball
handler gets a free shot.
Offensive & Defensive Rebounds
In Zak, Huang and Siegfried’s (1979) study of NBA team production efficiency
the authors find offensive and defensive rebounds to be statistically significant in
determining a teams win potential. After an unsuccessful shot on goal the ball is free and
in play so as long as it stays in bounds. This means teams who are willing to box out
harder, jump higher, and move faster to the ball will prevail. Therefore, offensive and
defensive rebounds are a direct measure of team aggressiveness throughout a game.
Starter Playtime vs. Bench Playtime
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Stern (1994) introduces the idea that coaching decisions are one of the primary
factors effecting game outcomes. This assertion led me to consider the coach’s risk taking
behavior and what affect it might have on foul calls. To measure coaches’ risk-taking
behavior I include the ratio of starter playtime to bench playtime for each game. When a
coach plays a star player he runs the risk of injuring or tiring out his player. Therefore, in
low-risk situations a coach would be more inclined to allow their star players to rest, and
play their bench players. However, in high-risk situations one would expect a coach to
take the risk of injuring or tiring out their star players, and play them to the end of the
game. For this reason I include the ratio of starter playtime to bench playtime to account
the coach’s propensity to take risks.
Measuring Aggressiveness
To measure the aggressiveness of each team competing in the championship I use
a stacked line chart to compare the difference of the leader from the laggard for each
aggressiveness measure. In every possible series score scenario, i.e. (0,0), (0,1), (0,2),
(1,1) etc. I calculate the average of each aggressiveness measurement and subtract the
laggard average from the leader average. That is, I calculate the average steals for the
leading team and the average steals for the lagging team in all (0,0) scenarios, then I
subtract the lagging average from the leading average.
Because the measures are all on different scales I use the stacked line chart to
identify trends in team play as the series progresses. To compare varying scenarios I list
the series scores in order of equal to most unequal, i.e. starting with (0,0) where one
would expect to see an even amount of aggressiveness by each team, and end with (0,3)

18

where one would expect to see the most aggressiveness by the lagging team and the least
aggressiveness by the leading team.
Identifying Referee Bias
To identify a referee bias towards the laggard I use a multiple-linear regression
and control for series score, as well as the aggressiveness measures listed above. The
regression I use is as follows:

Fouls = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ZeroZero + 𝛽2Fouls on Op.
Team ∗ ZeroOne + 𝛽3Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneZero + 𝛽4Fouls on
Op. Team ∗ ZeroTwo + 𝛽5Fouls on Op. Team ∗ TwoZero +
𝛽6Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneOne + 𝛽7Fouls on Op. Team ∗
ZeroThree + 𝛽8Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeZero + 𝛽9Fouls on Op.
Team ∗ TwoOne + 𝛽10Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneTwo + 𝛽11Fouls
on Op. Team ∗ OneThree + 𝛽12Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeOne +
𝛽13Fouls on Op. Team ∗ TwoTwo + 𝛽14Fouls on Op. Team ∗
TwoThree + 𝛽15Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeTwo + 𝛽16Fouls on Op.
Team ∗ ThreeThree + 𝛽17Steals + 𝛽18Blocks + 𝛽19Offensive
Rebounds + 𝛽20Defensive Rebounds + 𝛽21Field Goal
Attempts/Three-Point Attempts + 𝛽22Starter/Bench Playtime +
𝛽23Game Time+ 𝛽24At Home + 𝛽25Year
My regression consists of 182 observations due to the fact I consider fouls on both
teams from all 91 game observations.
Originally, I attempted to observe a referee bias in a foul ratio, which consisted of
the fouls on the leading team over the fouls on the lagging team. I anticipated that while
the series progressed I would see the aggressiveness of the lagging team increase and the
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aggressiveness of the leading team decrease. If this was in fact true, then one would
expect to observe a decrease in the foul ratio as stated above.
Unfortunately, when I ran my first regression I realized I had no measure for the
change in foul ratio I expected to see. I could observe a change as the series progressed,
but I had no concept of if that change was large or small. Because of this, I needed to
alter my regression to show foul calling variation in each series scenario opposed to the
other scenarios. To identify any variation in calls dependent on the series score I chose to
look at the number of fouls called on both teams throughout the series.
In my regression I regress the number of fouls on the opposing team multiplied by
a dummy variable for the series score at the time of the game. I also include controls for
the aggressiveness of the team whose fouls I am measuring to account for changes in play
throughout the series. My regression ultimately measures what affect fouls on the
opposing team have on the probability of having an additional foul called on the team in
question. Although this regression is unable to identify a bias towards the laggard, it does
have the ability to shed light on the effect of a foul call on the opposing team on fouls
called on the team in question depending on the series scenario.
Regression Variables
The dataset I run my regression on is setup with two observations of each game.
Fouls, the dependent variable in my regression, represents the number of fouls called on
team A in game X. Fouls on Op. Team represents the fouls called on team B in game X.
The Fouls on Op. Team is multiplied by a dummy variable relating to the series score at
the time of the game. For irrelevant series score variables the Fouls on Op. Team is
multiplied by zero, and for the relevant series score I multiply the number of fouls by one.
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The coefficients on each of the series score variables can be interpreted as the effect a
foul on the opposing team has on the probability of an additional foul called on the team
in question depending on the current series score. Although this does not help to identify
laggard referee bias, it does help to identify game situations in which the referees are
systematically keeping the game close, as well as game situations where the foul calls are
independent from each other.
To control for changes in play by teams over the course of the series I include all
of the aggressiveness measures I mention above. Steals represents the number of steals
called on team A when regressing on the fouls called on team A. Blocks represents the
number of blocks by team A. Offensive Rebounds and Defensive Rebounds represent the
number of offensive and defensive rebounds by team A respectively. Field Goal
Attempts/Three-Point Attempts is the ratio of team A’s field goal attempts over the
number of team A’s three-point attempts during the game in question. Starter/Bench
Playtime represents the total starter minutes of play over the total bench minutes of play
for team A. Game Time represents the total playtime of the game; this allows me to
control for games that went into overtime. At Home is a binary variable, which controls
for whether or not the teams were playing at home. Lastly, I control for changes to
tournament structure and play by including the Year of the series.
Each iteration of the regression represents the above variables for team A or team
B respectively. As mentioned previously, I control for intentional fouls called in the last
two minutes of each game by subtracting out all fouls called in the last two minutes. I
include overtime in the overall game time, therefore in games that went to overtime I
simply subtract out fouls from the last two minutes of overtime.
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Results
To analyze the change in aggressiveness of the leading and lagging teams
throughout the NBA finals I use a stacked line chart to measure the overall trends in team
aggressiveness. For each series scenario I find the average: fouls, field goal
attempts/three-point attempts, steals, blocks, offensive rebounds, defensive rebounds, and
starter/bench playtime for both the leading and the lagging team. Then I take the averages
and find the difference in aggressiveness between the leading and the lagging team in
each series scenario. These differences are then mapped using a stacked line chart to
display the overall difference in aggressiveness between the leaders and the laggards,
refer to Figure 8.
When mapped together using a stacked line chart one observes an initial uptick in
aggressiveness by the leading team in situations with a series score of (1,1), (2,2), and
(3,3). As the series spread increases one observes a shift in the difference in
aggressiveness resulting in a negative difference between the leader and the laggard. This
is consistent with my initial hypothesis: as the series spread increases one expects to see a
decrease in the aggressiveness of the leading team, and an increase in aggressiveness by
the lagging team.
In concern with team aggressiveness, my regression model does not display any
statistically significant observations. However, in regard to the correlation between a foul
being called on the other team and receiving a foul, I find multiple statistically significant
observations. In all series score scenarios, aside from Three Zero for which I had limited
observations, one observes a positive correlation between a foul being called on the
opposing team, and a foul being called on the team in question. Although not all
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coefficients are statistically significant, one observes a consistent increase in correlation
as the series spread increases. This can be interpreted as an observable trend in the
referees keeping the game closer through dependent foul calls in games with a larger
series spread, while calling fouls more independently in games with little to no series
spread. This does not confirm nor deny any bias in the referee’s calls towards the leader
or the laggard, but it does establish an observable increase in dependency on foul calls on
the opposing team with an increase in series spread when measuring the potential for an
additional foul call on the team in question.

Discussion
This paper examines a referee’s propensity to make foul calls on the leading team
of the NBA Finals due to a proposed increase in league revenue incentives during the
finals. The data consists of NBA Finals played over 15 years, in which 91 individual
games were played between 12 teams. As proposed in my hypothesis, I observe an
increase in the aggressiveness of the lagging team as the series spread increases, as well
as a decrease in the aggressiveness of the leading team. This is in line with the theory that
in a finite time horizon multiple-period contest, the laggard will increase their risk taking
behavior and effort as long as they have nothing more to lose.
Although I attempt to capture a referee bias towards the laggard, I am unable to
do so due to a lack of measure for the observable change in foul calls. However, my
regression results do point to various significant referee biases in the NBA Finals. First
off, I observe a trend in referee’s propensity to make foul calls dependent on an
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additional foul call on the opposing team. This dependency increases as the series spread
increases, implying the referees are systematically keeping the games closer by way of
foul calls in games with a high series score differential. This result is far from surprising.
One might expect the referees to make calls more independently when there is no leader
of the series, and to keep the game close as the potential for a series winner increases.
Additionally, when including the At Home variable I observe a significant
decrease in the total number of fouls called on the team in question. This finding is also
supported by previous literature as other studies have found a home court advantage
when investigating the NBA and NCAA. This finding again is far from surprising. One
expects referees to favor the home team due to an implicit bias as well as fan biases
towards their team during the game.
One surprising finding of my study is the negative correlation of Starter/Bench
Playtime to Fouls. I originally included Starter/Bench Playtime to measure the
aggressiveness of the coaches. I expected to see a positive correlation with fouls received
and the playtime ratio, however, I observe a negative coefficient in my regression. In
previous studies17 researchers have found that referees are less likely to make foul calls
on star players, especially at home, because the fans disapprove. This theory is a possible
explanation for why I observe a negative coefficient for Starter/Bench Playtime. Star
players are most likely to be starters. As coaches play more aggressively and use their
starters more, the referees may make less total foul calls because they are less inclined to
make calls on star players and increase the potential of them being forced out of the game.

17

Lehman and Reifman (1987)
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If one is looking to expand on this study in the future I highly recommend
approaching the problem from the beginning with an appropriate measure for the
difference in foul calling. I was unable to achieve my goal of identifying a referee bias
towards the laggard, however, I am still unconvinced it does not exist. Because I was
unable to measure to what degree the foul calls were changing in conjunction with a
change in aggressiveness of the two teams, I was prevented from making any significant
findings regarding a laggard bias. Had I had more time I would have completed a similar
study on the regular season. Had I done this I would have been able to establish a
standard for the correlation between the change in aggressiveness and the change in foul
calls. Additionally, I would include more measures for variation in team play. Originally,
I collected all the regular season averages for the statistics included in my analysis to
control for variation in team steals, starter/bench playtime, blocks, etc., but I chose to
exclude the data from my study due to possible variation in regular season play opposed
to Finals play. If I had completed the same study for the regular season, then I would
have been able to account for possible variation in play between the regular season and
the finals.
My study adds to existing literature pertaining to officiating baises in the NBA
Finals as well as supports past claims made by previous researchers. Although I did not
achieve my goal of proving both of my hypotheses correct, I found my first hypothesis
regarding team aggressiveness to be true, and I stumbled upon a few findings that in
general support my overall hypothesis that the NBA Finals are subject to referee bias in
line with extending the potential length of the series. It is my hope these finding will be
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expanded upon, and that someday someone is able to identify the bias I still strongly
believe is present.
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Figures
Figure 1: Difference in Means - Fouls
Series
Score
(0,0)
(1,1)
(2,2)
(3,3)
(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
(0,3)
Overall

Leader Avg. Fouls

Laggard Avg. Fouls

18.06
23.25
25.71
19.5
20.56
20.71
20.88
22
21.85
15.5
20.8

20.57
17.88
21.28
18
22.25
21.85
21.11
20.42
24.42
19.5
20.728

Difference

T-Stat

-2.5
5.36
4.42
1.5
-1.68
-1.14
-0.22
1.57
-2.57
-4
0.074

-1.68
2.99
2.01
0.74
-1.21
-0.82
-0.10
0.75
-1.35
-1.56

0.12

Figure 2: Difference in Means - Field Goal Attempts to Three Point Attempts
Leader Avg. Field
Laggard Avg. Field
Goal Attempts/Three Goal Attempts/Three Difference T-Stat
Point Attempts
Point Attempts
(0,0)
5.25
5.2
0.06
0.07
(1,1)
4.5
4.49
0.01
0.01
(2,2)
4.32
4.72
-0.4
-0.37
(3,3)
3.73
4.33
-0.6
-0.58
(0,1)
3.92
4.99
-1.06
-1.46
(1,2)
3.91
5.65
-1.74
-2.03
(2,3)
3.49
3.66
-0.16
-0.37
(0,2)
3.82
5.1
-1.28
-2.41
(1,3)
3.73
3.75
-0.01
-0.01
(0,3)
3.66
7.02
-3.36
-1.04
Overall
4.033
4.891
-0.85
-3.01
Series
Score
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Figure 3: Difference in Means - Steals
Series
Leader Avg. Steals
Laggard Avg. Steals
Difference T-Stat
Score
(0,0)
6.88
8.31
-1.44
-1.57
(1,1)
7.89
7.67
0.22
0.14
(2,2)
6.43
7.43
-1
-0.82
(3,3)
6.5
8.25
-1.75
-1.11
(0,1)
8
7.63
0.38
0.36
(1,2)
6.21
7.36
-1.14
-1.06
(2,3)
8.56
8.33
0.22
0.11
(0,2)
7
8.57
-1.57
1.26
(1,3)
6.43
8
-1.57
-1.47
(0,3)
6
5
1
1.00
Overall
6.99
7.655
-0.67
-1.63

Figure 4: Difference in Means - Blocks
Series
Leader Avg. Blocks
Laggard Avg. Blocks
Difference T-Stat
Score
(0,0)
5.5
4.63
0.88
0.91
(1,1)
6.33
4.78
1.56
1.61
(2,2)
3.67
6.33
-2.67
-1.52
(3,3)
4.75
5.5
-0.75
-0.61
(0,1)
6.38
4
2.38
2.37
(1,2)
4.64
4.71
-0.07
-0.05
(2,3)
4.78
6.38
-1.6
-0.99
(0,2)
4.57
4.86
-0.29
-0.18
(1,3)
6
4.57
1.43
0.91
(0,3)
2.5
3
-0.5
-0.44
Overall
4.912
4.876
0.037
0.09
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Figure 5: Difference in Means - Offensive Rebounds
Series
Leader Avg.
Laggard Avg.
Difference
T-Stat
Score
Offensive Rebounds
Offensive Rebounds
(0,0)
11.75
10.31
1.44
1.09
(1,1)
9.89
11.78
-1.89
-0.97
(2,2)
12.29
9.43
2.86
1.16
(3,3)
12.25
9.25
3
0.78
(0,1)
11.06
11.94
-0.88
-0.67
(1,2)
11.5
10.21
1.29
0.78
(2,3)
11.22
10.67
0.56
0.33
(0,2)
9.14
12
-2.86
-1.23
(1,3)
12.14
10.43
1.71
0.65
(0,3)
9
13
-4
-1.78
Overall
11.02
10.902
0.123
0.21

Figure 6: Difference in Means - Defensive Rebounds
Series
Leader Avg.
Laggard Avg.
Difference
T-Stat
Score
Defensive Rebounds Defensive Rebounds
(0,0)
33.19
28.06
5.13
3.63
(1,1)
28.44
30.11
-1.67
-0.89
(2,2)
26.71
26.43
0.29
0.12
(3,3)
31
32
-1
-0.36
(0,1)
29.88
29.25
0.63
0.39
(1,2)
30.64
30.79
-0.14
-0.08
(2,3)
33.22
32.44
0.78
0.28
(0,2)
27.43
29.86
-2.43
-0.78
(1,3)
31.43
30
1.43
0.71
(0,3)
33
28.5
4.5
2.49
Overall
30.49
29.744
0.752
1.09
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Figure 7: Difference in Means – Starter to Bench Playtime
Leader Avg.
Starter/Bench
Playtime

Series
Score
(0,0)
(1,1)
(2,2)
(3,3)
(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
(0,3)
Overall

Laggard Avg.
Starter/Bench
Playtime

Difference

2.51
2.15
2.89
2.71
2.5
2.7
2.48
2.28
2.55
3.47
2.624

2.78
3
3.41
4.86
2.44
2.43
2.7
3
2.65
2.08
2.935

T-Stat

-0.26
-0.85
-0.52
-2.16
0.06
0.27
-0.22
-0.72
-0.11
1.39
-0.31

-0.83
-2.12
-0.82
-2.90
0.17
0.83
-0.58
-1.65
-0.24
0.99

-0.76

Figure 8: Stacked Line Chart – Combined Difference in Means

Difference in Means: Team Aggressiveness
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2

(0,0)

(1,1)

(2,2)

(3,3)

(0,1)

(1,2)

(2,3)

(0,2)

(1,3)

(0,3)

-4
-6
-8
-10
-12

Fouls

Field Goal Attempts/Three Point Attempts

Steals

Blocks

Offensive Rebounds

Defensive Rebounds

Starter/Bench Playtime
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Figure 9: Regression Summary
Independent Variables
Coefficient
Std. Error
95% Conf. Interval
Series Score: (0,0)
0.104
[.106]
-.105
to
.313
Series Score: (0,1)
0.128
[.119]
-.107
to
.363
Series Score: (1,0)
0.200**
[.093]
.016
to
.384
Series Score: (0,2)
No Data
Series Score: (2,0)
0.200**
[.091]
.019
to
.380
Series Score: (1,1)
0.137
[.101]
-.063
to
.338
Series Score: (0,3)
No Data
Series Score: (3,0)
-0.023
[.152]
-.325
to
.277
Series Score: (1,2)
0.177*
[.095]
-.010
to
.365
Series Score: (2,1)
0.209*
[.115]
-.018
to
.437
Series Score: (1,3)
0.281***
[.092]
.099
to
.463
Series Score: (3,1)
0.266***
[.103]
.062
to
.470
Series Score: (2,2)
0.247***
[.094]
.061
to
.433
Series Score: (2,3)
0.148
[.123]
-.096
to
.392
Series Score: (3,2)
0.228**
[.104]
.022
to
.434
Series Score: (3,3)
0.139
[.118]
-.094
to
.372
Steals
0.126
[.098]
-.068
to
.321
Blocks
-0.15
[.118]
-.383
to
.083
Offensive Rebounds
-0.001
[.071]
-.140
to
.139
Defensive Rebounds
-0.058
[.080]
-.218
to
.101
FGA/TPA
0.289**
[.148]
-.003
to
.583
Starter/Bench Playtime
-0.516*
[.307]
-1.122 to
.090
Game Time
0.079*
[.045]
-.011
to
.170
At Home
-1.762***
[.580]
-2.909 to
-.614
Year
-0.114
[.089]
-.289
to
.061
All values statistically significant at the: *10%, **5%, & ***1% levels.
Number of observations: n = 182
R2 = .274
Fouls represents the number of fouls called on team A in game X. Fouls on Op. Team represents
the fouls called on team B in game X. Fouls on Op. Team is multiplied by a dummy variable
relating to the series score at the time of the game. The coefficients on each of the series score
variables can be interpreted as the effect a foul on the opposing team has on the probability of an
additional foul called on the team in question depending on the current series score. Steals
represents the number of steals called on team A. Blocks represents the number of blocks by team
A. Offensive Rebounds and Defensive Rebounds represent the number of offensive and defensive
rebounds by team A. Field Goal Attempts/Three-Point Attempts is the ratio of team A’s field goal
attempts over the number of team A’s three-point attempts. Starter/Bench Playtime represents the
total starter minutes of play over the total bench minutes of play for team A. Game Time
represents the total playtime of the game. At Home controls for whether or not the team is playing
at home. Year controls for the year of the series.
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Figure 10: NBA League Revenue by Year

Figure 11: Average Viewership of NBA Finals Games by Year
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